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Abstract 
This thesis applies a methodology based on the Novy (2013) ratio of trade barriers to 
identify variations in barriers to cross-provincial trade in the People’s Republic of China, 
econometrically tests for determinants of such variations, and together with the results 
of a field study determines the state of the current trade environment. Results of this 
study show the presence of such barriers to trade, and that those barriers have been 
varying over time as well as across provinces. Econometric testing shows that barriers 
to cross-provincial trade are highly dependent on transport infrastructure, international 
trade protection and industrialization. The field study contrasts both the results from the 
initial analysis and the econometric analysis. Implications and possible factors of this 
discrepancy are also discussed. 
摘要： 
本文应用 Novy（2013）中的贸易壁垒比率，通过实 证分析研究了中国人民共和国国内
省际贸易壁垒的变化和引起变化的原因，并结合实地调查研究以确定当前国内的贸易环
境。此项研究结果表明中国国内存在省际贸 易壁垒，且贸易壁垒随时间和地区差异而变
化。实证分析结果显示中国省际贸易壁垒高度依赖于产业化、国际贸易保护及国内交通
基础设施。实地调查结果与实证分 析结果相左。 本文还就二者差异产生的可能因素及
其影响进行了相关讨论。 
Supervisor: Maria Persson 
Keywords: Cross-Provincial Trade, Trade Barriers, the People’s Republic of China 
关键词：省际贸易，贸易壁垒，中华人民共和国 
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1 Introduction 
In recent decades, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has experienced tremendous 
economic growth and also a surge in economic integration on a global scale with a 
massive increase in international imports and exports. The domestic economic 
integration in the PRC is not that clear cut however, and there are numerous 
disagreements among scholars on this topic. This study aims to further elaborate on 
this topic and contribute to the ongoing discourse with a long-run overview of the 
development of domestic market integration.  
This paper has two main objectives. First, to determine whether or not there are 
domestic barriers to trade between provinces in the PRC, and if so, how they have 
varied over time. To capture these non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to domestic trade, an 
indirect methodology based on the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) gravity model 
and Novy (2013) ratio of trade barriers is used. Intuitively, the methodology suggests 
that trade barriers can be estimated relatively among provinces. At any given point in 
time, several economies may have similar bilateral trade with a third outside economy. 
But if consumption of domestically produced goods differs among the economies, this 
implies that those economies have dissimilar patterns of trade, assuming the gravity 
equation to be true. This realization allows for an indirect method of estimation. Second, 
to identify factors that explain variation in these domestic trade barriers, or, put 
differently, to find the sources of the internal barriers. This question is approached from 
two rather different methodological perspectives. First, indirectly derived measures of 
domestic trade barriers are used (in analogy with the Wong (2012) study) as the 
dependent variable in a regression analysis, and include a rich set of explanatory 
variables to see whether they can explain any of the statistical variation. Second, in-
depth interviews in the field with Chinese firms and foreign firms operating on the 
Chinese market are performed in order to determine what they perceive to be the 
causes of such trade barriers. While the first approach is useful by enabling formal 
statistical tests of hypotheses, the additional interviews allow for collection of much 
more detailed and case-specific information. In this sense, using these two 
methodological approaches in combination will lay the basis for well-founded 
conclusions in a way that using either one of them on its own would not. In particular, it 
will be very helpful for discussing realistic policy implications of the findings in this study. 
This paper is arranged in the following manner. Chapter 2 consists of an historical 
overview of the economic situation in China. The possible effects of outward openness 
and fiscal reform on domestic integration are included. Chapter 3 discusses results of 
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previous research and relates previous findings to this study. Chapter 4 presents the 
indirect measurement of domestic trade barriers, the methodology used and results. 
Chapter 5 consists of an econometric approach, estimating trade barriers over time in a 
panel data regression. Chapter 6 discusses the field study method and results. Chapter 
7 concludes the study. 
2 Overview of the Economic Development in the PRC 
Chinese growth during the economic transition was accompanied by large exports, and 
international trade has indeed played a large role in the economic development. The 
market transition started with the opening up policies issued by Deng Xiaoping in 1979. 
For several years the PRC has experienced double digit Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) growth rate, and massive development of foreign trade. The causal relationship 
between increased international integration and economic growth is still undetermined 
and is an ongoing debate among scholars. Nevertheless, it seems highly improbable 
that the PRC would have experienced this tremendous growth without foreign influence 
in trade and foreign direct investment. The overall development of output and export 
growth rates is shown in Figure 1.  
 
Note the decline in both GDP and export growth rates in 1989 due to macroeconomic 
instability and high inflation rates. These led students to pour into the Tian’anmen 
Square in Beijing in protest against the handling of the economic situation and the 
increasing corruption within the governmental apparatus. The political crisis escalated 
and the conservative fractions of the leadership ordered the military to clear the square, 
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Figure 1: Annual GDP and Export Growth 
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Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2013) 
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resulting in hundreds of people being killed. The international relations were stagnating 
and the international community held its breath. The 1989 - 1990 period is indeed the 
only one during the last 30 years when the GDP growth was below 5 per cent. After the 
Tian’anmen interlude the country experienced a series of unsuccessful reforms, and it 
was not until Deng Xiaoping’s “Southern Tour” to the special economic zones in 1992 
that the pendulum started swinging back and exports began booming. Since then the 
economy has been growing by around 10 per cent annually. Note also the rapid 
decrease in exports during the global recession 2008. 
What happened to domestic trade during this period? We can see from Figure 2 that 
there has been a massive increase in domestic traffic since the opening-up reform in 
1979. More interestingly, there seems to be a structural break in domestic trade around 
the time of World Trade Organization (WTO) entry in late 2001. This suggests that an 
increased international openness may have provided a larger domestic integration as 
well. The growth of domestic freight traffic is mostly due to the expansion of highways. 
There is also a growth of transport by water and railways, but not as remarkable as 
highways. Petroleum and gas freight traffic refers to transport by the means of 
pipelines. Petroleum and gas and Civil Aviation transport are negligible.  
 
During the economic transition, the central government launched a number of reforms 
on institutional restructuring. The first era of economic reform (1979-1992), starting with 
the Deng Xiaoping open door policy, was overall decentralizing. Authority and resource 
allocation was shifted to provincial governments. The main policy implications of the 
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Figure 2: Total Domestic Freight Traffic 
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second era of reform are market unification, recentralization of resources and 
macroeconomic control (Naughton, 2007:91). In 1994, recentralization policies of fiscal 
control boosted tax revenue to the central government from 28 per cent of total tax 
revenue in 1993 to 55 per cent in 1994 (see Figure 3 below). The revenue to central 
government has been maintained at over 50 per cent till the present time. However, 
much of the expenses still burden the local governments, and a central to local 
redistribution is evident. (Statistical Yearbook of China 2011:278). 
 
Fiscal decentralization may prove advantageous to market development. Qian and 
Roland (1998) present two main reasons. First, if factors of production are mobile the 
federal fiscal system gives rise to competition between provincial governments. Second, 
the fiscal decentralization may harden budget constraints for state-owned inefficient 
firms and provide incentives for local activities aimed at efficiency gains. Local 
governments have to compete in establishing a good business environment. If we 
assume that local firm performance has positive effects on tax revenue, local 
governments have incentives to make local firms prosper. Thus, local governments 
also have the incentive to protect firms from competition. 
From 1994 and onwards, provincial governments are dependent on the redistribution of 
fiscal revenue from the central government, as the greater expenses are on the 
provincial level. This dependency may have encouraged protection of local firms, not 
only to secure some revenue and become less dependent on the central government, 
but also the fact that keeping employment and production running provides a greater 
possibility of approval from the central government. In 1994, the government of the 
PRC also issued the Company Law, providing legal status to privately owned 
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enterprises. This may also have created support for a protectionist policy, as 
competition increased when previously illegal businesses now had legal rights. Prior to 
the company law, non-state businesses faced the risk of immediate shut down, a risk 
now absent. 
During the 1990s, economic reforms strengthened the institutions of the market 
economy, and emphasis was directed to macroeconomic control and regulations 
(Naughton, 2007:91). Those reforms were plain prerequisites for accession into the 
WTO. Extensive reforms in 1993 focused on the external sector and foreign exchange, 
and devaluation of the currency. Those were important steps towards a WTO 
membership which, after lengthy negotiations, were contracted in December 2001 
(Naughton 2007:105). The WTO accession implies a further step towards global 
openness of the Chinese economy. The weighted average of most favored nation tariff 
rates has decreased dramatically from 32 per cent in 1992 to well below 5 per cent in 
2010 (World Development Indicators 2013, World Bank). Reforms prior to the WTO 
entry consist of privatization of state owned enterprises and expansion of the private 
market by the distinctive dual-track system (双轨制). The intention was to maintain the 
planned economy while expanding the private sector, and gradually grow out of the 
plan. More export oriented reforms were passed in 1993 that unified the foreign 
exchange regime, currency devaluation and establishment of current-account 
convertibility. Steps towards a regulatory state were taken even further in the late 
1990s with the establishment of stock markets and regulatory supervision of securities, 
intellectual property, and quality controls (Naughton 2007:104). Those steps towards 
an economy governed under the rule of law increase the possibility of investing in 
companies listed on the stock exchanges and trade in securities within the country. 
Such a development may also affect the trade in other commodities. Note the constant 
high export growth rates subsequent to the WTO entry in 2001, excluding the financial 
crisis 2008-2009 (Figure 1). 
China has indeed taken steps towards global integration. Bransletter and Lardy (2006:3) 
provide an analysis of the major steps of the Chinese economic policies during the 
opening up period. The authors state that “the additional openings mandated under 
China’s WTO accession agreement will likely make China’s economy the most open of 
any large developing country, and, to date [2006], China has made reasonable 
progress toward meeting her obligations”. 
Although the Chinese government has promoted outward openness to a large extent, 
much of the integration of the domestic market is still uncertain. Most studies 
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conducted on domestic trade patterns in China show that protectionist policies issued 
by local government indeed pose substantial barriers to trade. There is no consensus, 
however, on whether the domestic market is becoming more integrated or increasingly 
fragmented, and to what extent foreign integration affects domestic integration. This 
outward openness policy may have created a competitive environment, which the 
Chinese firms have been forced to adapt to in order to maintain business contracts. As 
firms become more acclimatized to a competitive environment, they might lobby for 
higher domestic integration as well. 
Several anecdotes describe the nature of NTBs in interprovincial trade in China. Chen 
(1994:7-8) finds that regional disintegration started during the 1980s, and in 1986 the 
local government in Zhejiang province restricted the sale of silk cocoons to other 
provinces in order to favor local silk processing industries. To ensure profits for local 
automobiles production, local governments in Shanghai only allow taxi service cars to 
be a typical brand of car produced by the local joint venture firm with Volkswagen (Li, 
Qiu and Sun, 2003). Another anecdote tells of Shenzhen local government prohibiting 
a neighboring city, Guangzhou, from selling newspapers in order to keep profits from 
the local state-owned newspaper in Shenzhen (Gilley, 2001). 
Trade barriers are inherently hard to measure as they appear in many forms. This is 
especially true for NTBs. Naughton (2000) points out that local governments in the 
PRC rarely close their borders to interprovincial trade, and do not impose tariffs. 
Barriers typically consist of benefits for local firms, fees on sales of non-local goods, 
commercial licensing and quotas. It is important to remember that barriers to trade 
should not only be interpreted as the possible policies implemented and enforced by 
potentates, but as all obstacles to trade, intended or unintended. However, local 
officials have high influence over the local regulatory system and the enforcement 
apparatus. This enables local governments to impose NTBs on outside economic 
actors that significantly increase cross-provincial investments. High local government 
ownership puts local officials in a situation where they have on the one hand the 
economic objectives of the enterprise, and on the other hand political interests in 
maximizing tax revenues and sustaining employment. Because of these dual aims, and 
the possession of regulatory power both in production and trade, there is a clear 
incentive to protect local firms from outside competitors. The Chinese Industrial 
Economics Research Institute (1998:264) states: 
An appropriate number of producers in the same industry promotes competition, 
provides a diverse production mix of goods and services, reduces production costs 
and increases product quality. But it is also pointed out that an excessive number of 
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duplicative firms may create unsound competition and waste of resources. Today 
[1998], China’s local economic practices have resulted in an unreasonable amount of 
duplicative firms. One factor behind this is that the aims of the local governments are 
driven by financial ambitions and the display of political achievements. 
During the mid-1980s the government launched a series of foreign friendly reforms and 
established special economic zones in order to attract foreign capital (Fairbank and 
Goldman 2006:415). Very soon foreign companies moved manufacturing to mainland 
China. The international openness was soon to be interrupted by a political and 
economic crisis culminating in a civil uprising which shocked the western world and 
halted the foreign capital flow into the country. If domestic market integration was 
accompanied by foreign openness it is possible that the economic and social unrest in 
1987-1988 prior to the Tian’anmen square protests did not only destroy foreign 
relations but also had an impact on the domestic market integration. 
In conclusion, recent events may have affected the domestic trade environment in the 
PRC. First, the economic crisis and political turmoil in the mid-80s, resulting in mass 
protests in Tian’anmen square, substantially affected economic growth and 
international relations which may have affected the domestic market as well. Second, a 
fiscal reform and issuing of a Company Law in 1994 may have affected incentives for 
trade as firms were given the formal rights to do business, and may have spurred 
protectionist behavior from local policymakers. Third, the outward openness increased 
dramatically since the accession into the WTO in 2001. This outward openness may 
have created a competitive environment, which the firms have been forced to adapt to. 
As firms are more acclimatized to a competitive environment, they might lobby for 
higher domestic integration as well. Considering the descriptive statistics in Figure 1 
and Figure 2, one could see simultaneous growth of foreign trade and domestic trade. 
This suggests that the WTO entry may have affected domestic trade. Finally, the global 
economic recession 2008 and the stimulus package increased final consumption 
expenditure by 15 per cent in 2009, at the same time as international exports 
decreased by 10 per cent. This may have caused Chinese firms to turn to the domestic 
market, spurring domestic integration. Events of interest are summed up in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Important events  
1989 Social and economic turmoil, foreign relations 
stagnated. 
1994 Issuing of a Company Law. Formal rights for 
entrepreneurs to do business  
2001 WTO entry. Considerable increase in foreign trade. 
2008 Global Financial Crisis. Stimulus package to increase 
private consumption. 
 
3 Previous Research 
Several studies find that the domestic economic integration in China does indeed differ 
from the international outward policies conducted by the central government. There is 
no consensus however on the question of whether barriers to trade have varied over 
time and if there is an increasing or decreasing trend. Young (2000) argues that the 
economic transition into a market economy resulted in increasing interregional 
competition between duplicative industries. This threatened the profitability of industries, 
leading local governments to impose various barriers to trade. With the rise of 
international openness, the domestic market became fragmented. Poncet (2001, 2003, 
and 2005) uses a model of monopolistic competition inspired by Krugman (1980) to 
analyze the degree of domestic integration in the PRC. Interesting findings in these 
studies are that on the one hand Chinese provinces seem to rely more on domestic 
trade than international trade. On the other hand, provincial trade barriers seem to 
have been high and rising during the years 1987-97. According to the author, this 
contradictory behavior is the result of a dual objective by local governments, namely 
socio-economic stability and maximization of fiscal revenue. Another study by Wong 
(2012) uses provincial input-output data for the period 1992-2002 in order to measure 
domestic trade barriers, and finds that domestic trade barriers indeed have been rising 
during this period. Interestingly, foreign trade and intra-provincial (local) purchases 
have risen, while the share of domestic cross-provincial trade has been decreasing. 
One reason could be that international trade has been substituted for domestic trade, 
but according to the findings of Wong it is more likely that domestic protectionism is 
high and rising. The Wong (2012) study applies the same methodology as in this paper 
to estimate cross-provincial trade barriers. 
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In contrast to the results of the Wong (2012) and Poncet (2001, 2003 and 2005), Xu 
and Li (2011) find support for a development in the opposite direction. They apply a 
traditional gravity equation approach using a dataset based on railway freight among all 
provinces from 1985 to 2007. This dataset allows for a gravity equation approach but 
note the trend in domestic freight traffic (Figure 2). Railway freight represents only a 
small part of total traffic, suggesting unreliable results. They find several biases in 
domestic trade patterns, including home bias, and a negative correlation between 
international and cross-provincial trade. The results also show a negative trend in 
border effects (down by 50 per cent during the period of study), implying that regional 
protectionism is decreasing. Li, Qiu and Sun (2003) examine the factors behind 
interregional protection, and find that high external trade protection and domestic fiscal 
decentralization (as during the economic transition of the PRC) are main factors. This 
also suggests that the domestic trade barriers will diminish as a result of the external 
trade liberalization and as a result of the accession to the WTO. The mechanism 
behind this causality can be explained by a two-sector model. Li, Qiu and Sun 
(2003:229) states: 
Foreign firms and domestic firms are competing for profits in all local markets. [… W]e 
confine internal decentralization to tax reform in which the central government lowers the 
rate of profit tax that local firms must remit to the state, combined with a reduction of 
revenue transfer from the central government to each region. Tax reduction increases 
regional governments’ incentives to protect their local firms’ profits although protection 
reduces consumer surplus. When the country’s external trade protection is high, the 
gains from interregional protection will be sufficiently large to warrant local governments’ 
imposition of interregional trade barriers. 
When international trade protection is high, the incentive is high for local governments 
to protect local industries for the purpose of maintaining tax revenue. Increased 
external openness, by for example entering the WTO, may therefore put pressure on 
cross-provincial trade protection as well. Considering the development of domestic 
freight traffic and international trade (Figure 1 and 2), the author’s suggestions might be 
the case. Holz (2009) examines the results of Young (2000), and finds that the author’s 
arguments are flawed and problematic, and the evidence is questionable. By 
comparing domestic trade in the PRC with the United States (US), Holz finds that 
domestic trade in the PRC is well within ordinary range. It might be the case that cross-
provincial trade in China is as supple as in any developed country. 
Numerous studies, applying various theoretical models and datasets, have been used 
in attempts to analyze regional protectionism in the PRC. There is no general 
consensus on whether or not the internal market of the PRC is characterized as a level 
playing field for all engaged in trade. In contrast to previous studies, this paper 
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presents a study on domestic trade barriers in the PRC, which applies data covering a 
long continuous time period. The outcomes contribute to an analysis of the long-run 
development of cross-provincial trade barriers in China.  
4 Indirectly Measuring Internal Trade Barriers 
This study applies an indirect method of estimating barriers to trade. Cross-provincial 
trade data for the PRC neither specify region of origin for imports nor destination of 
exports, making it impossible to estimate trade barriers with the traditional gravity 
equation approach. Due to the inherent difficulties in measuring barriers to trade and 
the limited access to data, trade barriers will be indirectly estimated by approximation 
using the Wong (2012) method. This is done in order to determine the magnitude of 
interprovincial trade protectionism, and to investigate if these barriers vary across 
provinces and if there have been any changes in those barriers over time. 
An indirect measure of trade barriers is created, which includes all costs related to 
trade, including distance and NTBs in a single variable. The indirect measure is 
theoretically founded in the gravity model and is calculated using trade data from China 
Statistical Yearbooks (1981-2011), which is available and easy to access. 
4.1 Theoretical Presumption  
The theoretical model used to measure barriers to trade is the gravity equation1 based 
on the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) framework with exogenous trade costs:  
     
     
∑    
(
   
    
)
   
 (1) 
Consider two economies, i and r. Xir is the nominal exports from economy i to r. Yk is 
the nominal income of an economy k. The denominator ∑     represents the total 
income of all individual economies. As a result of trade costs, due to distance between i 
and r and various trade barriers, there is a gross bilateral trade cost factor tir. A good 
originating from i with the price pi in i, has a price pir = tirpi in economy r. The bilateral 
trade cost tir includes not only tariffs but also geographical distance and various NTBs. 
1 - σ is the elasticity of substitution (EOS). Pi and Πr represent price indices of each of 
the provinces. 
                                               
1
 Economic gravity models predict bilateral trade flows based on economic size and distance 
between two economies, mimicking the gravitational attraction described by Isaac Newton’s law 
of gravity. 
12 
 
The insight of the gravity equation is derived from Isaac Newton’s laws of motion. The 
implication is that bigger economies – ceteris paribus - trade more with each other. 
High trade costs tir reduce trade and are affected by the price indices of the economies. 
Pi and Πr can be interpreted as multilateral resistance variables. Multilateral trade 
resistance in the trade barriers refers to the magnitude of barriers to trade which are 
faced by all trade partners for a particular economy. 
Instead of using the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) assumptions of bilateral trade, 
the model applied is altered by Novy’s (2013) method, which provides an analytical 
solution for deriving resistance variables. This measure is based on the intuition that a 
ratio of local purchases to their bilateral trade is an expression of trade barriers. The 
intuition is as follows. Consider three economic regions A, B and C. Regions A and B 
has the same bilateral trade with C. But A consumes more locally produced goods than 
B. This is to say that A has a higher resistance towards trade and thus has higher trade 
barriers. This is true if the gravity equation is a correct representation of trade flows, 
and higher trade barriers result in lower trade volumes. Note that the measure of trade 
barriers includes all costs related to trade. Differences in resistance variables may be 
due to distance and other factors. The multilateral trade resistance for an economy i 
can thus be derived from equation (1). 
      (
   
  
⁄
  
∑    
⁄
)
 
   
    (2) 
This equation (2) above is an explicit solution for the multilateral trade resistance      
for an economy i. However, the equation (1) includes the multilateral trade resistance 
     for two economies i and r. A solution for this is to simply multiply equation (1) with 
the reversed trade route Xri, namely bilateral trade from economy r to i. This gives the 
following expression. 
        (
     
∑    
)
 
(
      
        
)
   
 (3) 
Now we can substitute      and      in the denominator with equation (2), and 
rearrange. 
  
      
      
 (
      
      
)
 
   
  (4) 
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Trade costs may not be symmetric, that is tir does not necessarily equal tri. The same 
goes for trade costs within the regions, tii and trr. To account for this, the geometric 
mean2 is used. As mentioned earlier, the trade cost t represents a gross bilateral trade 
cost. In order to achieve an expression for the tariff equivalent trade costs a value of 
one (1) is subtracted. The tariff equivalent trade costs from i to r is denoted τir. 
 τ   √
      
      
   (
      
      
)
 
 (   )
   (5) 
In this paper, the change of trade barriers over time is also of interest. This is denoted 
by a caret ^, and the variable transformation is given by τ̂   
   (   )
   ( )
 where θ is any 
given observed point of time (year). Hence we have the relation: 
 τ̂   √
 ̂   ̂  
 ̂   ̂  
   (
 ̂   ̂  
 ̂   ̂  
)
 
 (   )
   (6) 
As mentioned before, there is a limitation to domestic trade data in the PRC. Trade 
data is aggregated towards all outside provinces, and actual export destinations and 
import origin cannot be determined. To account for these, approximations similar to 
those done by Wong (2012) are carried out. Let us start with some definitions. Define 
the total set of provinces in China by   {        }. For any given province Si, define 
all provinces but Si as C\Si. The geometric average will serve as an approximation of 
the arithmetic average of province Si’s imports from the rest of China
3. Cardinality of C 
is given by | |. An issue related to this method of approximation is the inequality of 
arithmetic and geometric means. The two means will be equal if and only if every 
number is the same, otherwise, if numbers are non-negative, the arithmetic mean will 
always be greater than the geometric mean. Hence, this approximation will produce a 
slightly under-valued estimation of trade barriers. The magnitude of the under-valuation 
is greater if there is a large variation among the numbers for which the mean is to be 
calculated. Nevertheless, this approximation is necessary in order to estimate trade 
barriers due to the specific nature of domestic trade data available.  
Using this, the observed values of province Si’s imports from the rest of China C\Si can 
be approximated by: 
                                               
2
 A geometric mean of a set of data   {          } is given by √∏   
 
   
 
. 
3
 Formally: 
       
| |
 
∑           
| |
 √∏           
| |
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         | |  ( ∏
     
∑      
(
   
    
)
   
      
)
 
| |
 
The geometric average approximation of the arithmetic mean for purchases from the 
rest of China, originating from itself,            becomes: 
          
| | 
 
∑           ∑ ∑                    
| | 
 ( ∏ ∏    
            
)
 
| | 
 
This can be approximated by: 
           | |
  ( ∏ ∏    
     
∑      
(
   
    
)
   
            
)
 
| | 
 
By applying these approximated averages to the Novy (2013) ratio of trade flows 
(equation (4)), we achieve a rather muddled expression: 
 
               
               
 
(∏    
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)
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| | 
 (7) 
By defining the approximated trade barriers  ̅       ,  ̅       ,  ̅          as 
 ̅        ( ∏    
      
)
 
| |
  ̅        ( ∏    
      
)
 
| |
      ̅          
(∏              )
 
| |
(∏   
 
   
 
          
)
 
| | 
 
we can rephrase the measured trade barriers in the Novy (2013) ratio in equation (7). 
The approximated tariff equivalent trade costs from Si to      can thus be derived from 
equation (4) and (7): 
 τ̅        √
 ̅       ̅       
       ̅        
   (
               
               
)
 
 (   )
   (8) 
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The variable τ̅        derived from equation (8) will be used as the dependent variable in 
the econometric analysis. The interpretation of this trade barrier is an approximated 
geometric average of bilateral trade barriers between a province Si and the rest of 
China     , relative to local trade barriers, that is sales within the province. Keep in 
mind that this estimated trade barrier is a tariff equivalent approximation of the total 
trade costs, including transport and other natural obstacles to trade. Naturally, the 
variation of trade barriers over time can be expressed as: 
 τ̂̅        √
 ̂̅       ̂̅       
 ̂      ̂̅        
   (
 ̂       ̂       
 ̂      ̂        
)
 
 (   )
   (9) 
Several studies have applied the Novy (2013) ratio of trade barriers in order to estimate 
trade barriers. Eaton, Kortum, Neiman and Romalis (2011) use this method to analyze 
changes in trade patterns in the aftermath of the world economic recession 2008-2009. 
Jacks, Meissner and Novy (2010) apply this method in order to analyze determinants of 
trade booms during the twentieth century. Wong (2012) uses provincial input-output 
data applied to the Novy (2013) ratio and applies the approximations above to estimate 
trade barriers in the PRC.  
4.2 Data 
Numerous previous studies on this topic use data ranging to 2007. However, from 2007 
until the present day, several events may have affected trade patterns, not only 
internationally, but also within the PRC. To capture the possible effects of such events, 
the analysis conducted in this paper will apply interprovincial trade data ranging from 
1981 to 2011. Several events may have affected the domestic trade environment in the 
PRC in recent decades (remember Table 1). Sector-specific domestic trade data on 
industry level can be considered sensitive to the local governments and is not available 
for public use. Input-output tables on provincial levels are published every five years, 
and contain industry level imports and exports. This data is frequently used to estimate 
domestic integration. There are two major weaknesses with this data, apart from the 
difficulties related to obtaining the dataset. First, the data is fragmented in time with a 
five year span between observations. Naturally, there is a possibility of some of those 
observed years being an exception from the long-run pattern, at least for some of the 
provinces, resulting in skewed data. Secondly, the input-output table data does not 
include place of origin of imports or destination of exports. This excludes the use of a 
traditional gravity model estimation of barriers to trade. The advantage of these tables 
is obviously the industry level details. Data on domestic trade may also be retrieved 
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from provincial and national statistical yearbooks. This data is aggregated, and does 
not specify origin and destination of trade, similar to the input-output tables. The 
advantage with statistical yearbook data is instead time consistency, with available 
annual data on domestic trade until the year 2011. 
The analysis in this paper instead uses aggregated data retrieved from statistical 
yearbooks, which is available and easy to access. The primary reason for using this 
data is the continuity with respect to time, thus providing a better approach in 
estimating the effect of variables varying over time. The data is aggregated over 
sectors, with the exception of some yearbooks which discern trade in agricultural goods 
from trade in manufactures. However, as this is inconsistent, aggregate trade data is 
used. A table with definitions and sources of data used in this study is provided in 
Appendix 9.1. 
Data for domestic exports (        ) can be retrieved from the statistical yearbooks, and 
data for domestic imports (        ) can be calculated as the difference between 
domestic exports and net exports (foreign trade included). Exchange rates are 
retrieved from Penn World Tables Database for calculation of foreign trade values. 
Consumption of locally produced goods (      ) is calculated as province total imports 
subtracted from total consumption. The rest of China local purchases (          ) are 
calculated as international exports and exports to province Si subtracted from total 
output of the rest of China. 
The data has several issues which must be taken into consideration. Firstly, during the 
time period in the dataset, some provinces have at least one observation where the 
value of trade exceeds the gross provincial consumption. This is true for most of the 
developed coastal areas but also some inland provinces. Presumably, the provinces in 
question have lower trade barriers as they have managed to establish such a trade-
intensive business environment. Due to this, the concerned provinces4 are dropped. 
The province of Hainan was a part of Guangdong province prior to 1988, and trade 
data is available from 1996. Data for the autonomous region of Tibet is available from 
1994. Secondly, as trade data in statistical yearbooks refer to the total value of goods 
and commodities imported and exported, it becomes impossible to distinguish to what 
extent the trade consists of outright exportation, re-importation and processing and 
refining for further trade. Therefore, there is an uncertainty regarding the calculation of 
consumption of local goods. This identical methodology has been applied in a study by 
                                               
4
 Dropped provinces are: Beijing, Chongqing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Hubei, 
Jiangsu, Jilin, Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin, Xinjiang and Zhejiang. 
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Wong (2012). That study, in contrast to the one presented in this paper, does not suffer 
from the same data issues, presumably because of the limited time period of the study. 
Despite the flaws in the data, it may still be useful to indirectly estimate barriers to 
cross-provincial trade in the PRC. This data allows for an analysis of long-run 
development, which is not possible with the sector-specific data published every fifth 
year. 
4.3 Domestic Trade Barriers in the PRC 
The approximated trade barriers are calculated by equation (8) with four different 
values for the EOS. Wong (2012) use values between 7 and 12 to represent the EOS. 
In contrast to the Wong study, which applies industrial sector specific data and 
therefore is able to choose values of EOS suitable for specific sectors, this assessment 
applies aggregate data. Because of the impossibility of determining different EOS in 
various sectors, and more specifically, various goods, lower values for EOS are used. 
This captures various degrees of substitutability between goods. Values of two (2), five 
(5), eight (8) and twelve (12) are used in this study. A higher EOS will generate a lower 
value of approximated bilateral trade costs. Some descriptive statistics of the 
approximated trade costs are presented in Table 2 and Table 3 below. 
Table 2: Standard deviation of estimated bilateral trade barriers  ̅        
 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
 (overall) (between) (within) 
EOS = 2 0.533 0.147 0.119 0.095 
EOS = 5 0.271 0.089 0.077 0.051 
EOS = 8 0.181 0.062 0.055 0.035 
EOS = 12 0.125 0.044 0.039 0.024 
     
Table 3: Mean of estimated bilateral trade barriers  ̅        (selected years) 
 Mean over year 
 1981 1991 2001 2011 
EOS = 2 0.528 0.483 0.514 0.393 
EOS = 5 0.269 0.240 0.264 0.194 
EOS = 8 0.179 0.159 0.177 0.129 
EOS = 12 0.124 0.109 0.122 0.089 
 
The descriptive statistics reveal variations in the cross sectional data (between) as well 
as in the time dimension of the dataset (within). The between standard deviation is thus 
the variation between provinces in the dataset, and the within standard deviation is 
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variation within a province over the period of time studied (1981-2011). From Table 2, 
we can see that the variation is larger between provinces over time, suggesting high 
variation in domestic integration between provinces. This is true for all values for EOS. 
The difference between the provinces with highest and lowest trade barriers is 0.22 in 
1981 and 0.41 in 2011 (calculated with EOS = 5). The difference is due to that some 
provinces have lowered trade costs considerably, while others are unchanged. Table 3 
shows an overall decreasing, yet weak trend in average trade barriers across the entire 
time period in the data. This can also be seen in Figure 4 below. By ocular inspection 
of the average trend in domestic trade barriers in Figure 4, one could identify some 
possible structural tendencies. After the opening up reform initiated by Deng Xiaoping 
in the late 1970s until the economic and political turmoil during the late 1980s, the PRC 
seems to have experienced a development towards domestic integration.  After the 
economic and political recovery it appears as if the domestic integration came to a 
standstill, and perhaps the federalist and local protectionist influences promoted a 
reverse development. Finally, after the WTO accession in December 2001, there is a 
noteworthy decrease in domestic trade barriers with the exception of the 2008 global 
financial meltdown. 
The development of market integration in the PRC is fluctuating over time and there is 
no apparent long-run homogenous trend. It is obvious that shorter periods of time, for 
example the period 1992-2002 studied by Wong (2012), are not representative for a 
long-run development of market integration in the PRC.  
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Tests for structural breaks are performed to determine the existence of any significant 
trends in specific periods of time that differ from the long-run average. The test is 
constructed as a regression with the average of the estimated trade barrier τ̅        as 
dependent on time (EOS value of 2 is used). This time series is complemented with 
dummy variables for the intercept and a slope with a value of one (1) for the period 
which is tested, and a value of zero (0) otherwise5. Results are presented in Table 4. 
Tests show no significant results for the years after the Tian’anmen interlude, the fiscal 
reform 1994 – 2001 or the stimulus package in 2008 in the aftermath of the world 
financial crisis. However, since entry into WTO in 2001, the domestic market has 
experienced significant decreases in trade barriers. This suggests that the outward 
openness policy is indeed accompanied by domestic market reforms as well. This is 
also proposed in a previous study by Li, Qiu and Sun (2003). 
  
                                               
5
 The equation τ̅             (        )               is estimated and coefficient 
values for    (slope dummy) and    (intercept dummy) are presented in Table 4. 
Figure 4: Approximated trade barriers plot 
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When examining the growth of demand for foreign, domestic and local goods, this 
development does seem to strengthen the argument for joint domestic and foreign 
market integration around the time of WTO entry. The development of demand for 
foreign, domestic and local goods is presented in Figure 5. Prior to the time around the 
WTO entry in 2001, demand for domestic imports, foreign imports and locally produced 
goods increased steadily at fairly equal pace. Starting around 2004, the growth in 
demand for domestic imports explodes. Note the figure shows province average, and 
size and economic development are highly dissimilar between provinces. Nevertheless, 
the cross provincial trade in the PRC has on average increased tremendously during 
the last decade. 
Table 4: Test for structural breaks 
  Dummy (EOS=2) Dummy (EOS=12) 
Event Year Intercept Slope Intercept Slope 
Social and 
Economic Turmoil 
1989 - -2.061 
(11.410) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
-1.782 
(3.483) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Fiscal reform and 
Company Law 
1994 - 
2001 
-17.679 
(13.191) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
-5.069 
(4.018) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
WTO Entry 2002† -  47.917*** 
(7.717) 
-0.024*** 
(0.004) 
13.123*** 
(2.369) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
Stimulus Package 2008 - -1.178 
(30.809) 
0.001 
(0.016) 
-0.095 
(9.424) 
0.000 
(0.005) 
Note: Standard error in parentheses. Coefficient significantly different from zero with 10% 
(*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) confidence level (two tailed). 
† WTO entry in December 2001, dummy created from 2002 
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The change in cross provincial trade barriers differs between individual provinces 
(Table 2). The between-province standard deviation of approximated trade barriers is 
greater than the time variant standard deviation. This means explicitly that the variation 
in trade barriers between provinces is larger on average than the variation each 
province has experienced over the period 1981-2011. The overall trend of trade 
barriers which is estimated may therefore not be representative for any single province, 
but is better regarded as an indicator of domestic economic integration. 
Further examination of the data is necessary in order to get a better view of the 
development of trade barriers for individual provinces. Figure 6 illustrates the between 
variation among the provinces. The provinces which experienced least market 
integration until 2011 are located in the western parts of China. The difference between 
1981 and 1996 is marginal. It seems as if there is a more prevalent regional bias in 
1996 suggesting that such a bias should be tested for in the econometric regression. In 
2011, all of the provinces in the dataset examined experienced increased domestic 
economic integration by means of significantly decreasing barriers to cross-provincial 
trade. Estimation of trade barriers is lower in all provinces, but still high in western and 
northwestern regions. Graphs of continuous development of trade barriers in individual 
provinces are provided in Figure 7. By examining the different continuous trends, one 
Figure 5: Demand (province average) 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2011, National Bureau of Statistics of China 
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could see that some areas have experienced a tremendous change, while other areas 
have experienced almost no change since 1981. 
 
 
Figure 6: Estimated trade barriers by province 
 
Note: No data for estimation of trade barriers for Hainan province and 
Tibet autonomous region for 1981. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
Barriers to cross-provincial trade are estimated using a method in analogy with the 
Wong (2012) study. The estimation is negatively biased due to inequality of arithmetical 
and geometrical means, implying that the actual trade barriers might be slightly higher 
than the calculated values. There are three main outcomes. First, there are internal 
barriers to cross-provincial trade in the PRC. Second, the estimated tariff equivalent 
barriers to cross-provincial trade have been shown to vary over time and have been, on 
average, significantly lower during the last decade. Third, the variation between 
provinces is huge. The economic reforms may have affected provinces differently. 
Even though the reforms are launched by the central government, the execution and 
enforcement may differ among the local governments. It might also be the case that 
provinces in the west and far north of the country are somewhat isolated from 
international trade. Assuming the positive correlation between increasing international 
economic integration and diminishing domestic trade barriers to be true, provinces with 
limited access to seaway transport and limited exposure to foreign influence do not 
experience this effect. Determinants of the estimated barriers are examined by an 
econometric analysis.  
  
Figure 7: Estimated trade barriers by province 
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5 Regression Analysis 
In order to identify factors that explain variation in the domestic trade barriers several 
regressions are made. Indirectly derived measures of domestic trade barriers as the 
dependent variable in a regression analysis are used, and include a set of independent 
variables to see whether they can explain any of the statistical variation. 
The indirect measure of domestic trade barriers is used in a panel data regression 
analysis in order to examine possible determinants of changes in trade barriers over 
time. The method of econometric approach is a panel data with fixed effects capturing 
the unobserved independent heterogeneity between provinces. By using a fixed effects 
model we assume that the individual specific effects (the unobserved heterogeneity 
between provinces) are correlated with the independent variables. Provinces may have 
attributes that do not vary over time, or at least not during the period of study. These 
attributes may be related to business environment, cultural characteristics, 
geographical features etc. and they may or may not be observable. Regardless if they 
are observable or not, all time invariant variables will be captured by the fixed effects 
model. 
5.1 Methodology and Data 
The dataset used contains both a time-series (time dimension) and cross-section 
(individual provinces). This two-dimensional data (panel data) contains observations on 
multiple variables over multiple time periods. Panel data models may be specified as a 
pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, or with specific individual effects which 
can be correlated with the independent variables (fixed effects model), or uncorrelated 
with the independent variables (random effects model). The regression equation to be 
estimated is therefore two-dimensional.  
τ̅               
Dependent variable is the approximated trade barrier τ̅       . Estimations of this barrier 
are done with various degrees of EOS but the correlations between estimates are well 
above 0,98. This suggests similar results regardless of which estimate is applied as 
dependent variable. EOS with a value of 2 is used for calculation of  τ̅        in the 
econometric analysis in this paper. Results from regressions applying other values of 
EOS are provided in Appendix 9.2. Higher values of EOS will generate lower coefficient 
values in absolute terms, but signs (+/-) are not affected. 
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Several independent variables (Xit) are selected in order to try to explain the variation in 
trade barriers over time and across provinces. Hypotheses are constructed for each of 
the variables. 
Independent variables include per capita GDP (gdp_pc). It seems reasonable that 
more economically prosperous areas have relatively high consumer demand, and 
perhaps also a demand for a larger variety of goods. This will in turn affect the trade 
relations and may therefore affect trade barriers. A higher per capita GDP is expected 
to decrease barriers to trade. Per cent labor force in urban areas (urb_emp) is an 
indicator of urbanization. Urban areas have easier access to transport routes. A 
relatively larger number of people benefiting from this access is expected to decrease 
barriers to trade. A variable for per cent of gross industrial output contributed by state 
owned enterprises (gio_soe) is also added. If barriers to cross-provincial trade are 
induced by protectionist behavior of local governments, state owned firms with access 
to political capital, that is valuable connections to the local governments, can take 
advantage of this to facilitate trade procedures. A high ratio of state ownership is 
therefore expected to generate low cross-provincial trade barriers. Number of persons 
enrolled to higher education (edu) is an indicator of education. Higher education may 
provide a more developed ability to produce competitive goods. On the other hand, 
relatively low education levels may generate incentives for provincial governments to 
protect local producers of less competitive goods. A high education level is expected to 
decrease barriers to trade. Total length of railways (railways) and highways (highway) 
in the province is expected to decrease trade barriers due to better possibilities of 
engaging in trade. The sheer possibility of engaging in trade depends on access to 
adequate infrastructure. Industrialization of a region is likely to develop tradable goods 
at least to some extent. Share of contribution to GDP from secondary (gdp_sec) and 
tertiary sector (gdp_ter) is therefore expected to decrease barriers to trade for the 
same reason as a high per capita GDP. More tradable goods and relatively high 
welfare increase the demand for variety in goods and subsequently decrease trade 
barriers. The causality may also be the opposite, as decreasing trade barriers 
facilitates trade and provides the possibility of efficiency gains by trade in intermediate 
goods and utilize large scale production. 
Dummy variables are created to check for time variant structural breaks and specific 
year dummies (year-dummy). Breaks are tested for periods during economic and social 
turmoil in 1987, fiscal reform in 1994, WTO entry in 2001, and stimulus package 
appointed to boost consumption in the aftermath of the global recession in 2008. A 
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regional dummy for remote provinces6 (region_remote) is constructed to determine if 
there is a regional bias. List of variables are presented in Appendix 9.1 and correlation 
matrix is presented in Appendix 9.2.  
The Breusch Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects shows significant 
results at the 1 per cent confidence level, which implies that a model should be 
constructed with individual specific effects instead of a pooled OLS regression7. The 
Hausman test also shows significant results at the 1 per cent confidence level, 
suggesting differences between a fixed effects model and a random effects model8. 
The fixed effects model estimates are unbiased but variances may be high. A random 
effects model will generate more efficient estimates given the assumption that specific 
individual effects are uncorrelated with the independent variables. However, if this 
assumption is violated, the estimates will be biased. If possible, it is desirable to apply 
a random effects model as it is more efficient, but because it might be biased when 
using this data, a fixed effects model is constructed for the purpose of this analysis. 
τ̅                
Naturally, we also assume spherical errors, that is homoskedasticity (var(uit)=   
 ) and 
no autocorrelation (cov(uit, ujs)=0   i≠j or t≠s). αi is the unobserved individual 
heterogeneity and Xit is the independent variables matrix with coefficient values of β. 
Intuitively αi can be thought of as a series of dummy variables for each individual, and 
the model can in theory be estimated using least squares with identical estimates. 
However, the dummy variables will increase the number of parameters in the 
regression and decrease the degrees of freedom and thus efficiency. The individual 
heterogeneity will therefore encompass all parameters of variables that do not vary 
over time in a fixed effects model.  Regional biases must therefore be tested with a 
random effects model. The constant effect   is regarded as an average in the random 
effects model. 
τ̅               
                                               
6
 Qinghai, Tibet, Gansu, Ningxia and Inner Mongolia. 
7
 The Breusch Pagan Lagrangian multiplier tests if there is any significant variance over entities, 
that is to see if there is any difference between units (a panel effect). The null hypothesis is that 
the variance is zero (no panel effect). X
2 
= 772,21 represents a p-value of 0,0000. As the null 
hypothesis can be rejected we assume a panel effect. 
8
 The Hausman test evaluates which of two estimators, one which is consistent under the null 
and alternative hypothesis and the other which is consistent under the null only. If the null can 
be rejected there is probably a difference between the random effects model (null) and the fixed 
effects model (alternative). X
2 
= 22,78 represents a p-value of 0,0019. 
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A modified Wald test for group-wise heteroskedasticity shows significant signs of 
heteroskedasticity and a Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in the panel data shows 
signs of autocorrelation. First differences show no signs of autocorrelation, implying 
that the model suffers from AR(1) disturbances. A Variance-covariance matrix is 
adjusted with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors by applying a clustered 
matrix9. Usually one would assume that the errors are independently and identically 
distributed. However, as the model generates non-spherical errors, thus violating this 
assumption, we instead have a more general assumption that the error terms are 
clustered. Errors in one specific individual are correlated in some way with each other, 
but uncorrelated to errors in other individuals. We keep the assumption of no 
correlation across provinces, but allow for within province correlation.  
5.2 Results 
Results from the regressions are shown in Table 5. An initial regression includes all the 
independent variables. This regression shows signs of over-specification, and the 
omitted variables test statistic represents a p-value of way below five per cent. In order 
to remedy the misspecification of the model, variables with low explanatory power10 are 
dropped in the second regression. The third regression estimates first order differences 
in all variables.  First order difference estimation is done to determine how fast the 
trend returns to its average after a random shock. Dummy variables for passages in 
time are added in the fourth regression in order to test for structural breaks. The fifth 
and sixth regressions are the random effects model, where the individual heterogeneity 
of the provinces is assumed to be normally distributed. The individual effects are 
instead estimated as an average. This is done in order to provide the option to include 
time-invariant variables. More specifically, a dummy for remote regions is added. 
  
                                               
9
 Clustered variance-covariance matrix in Panel data regressions in STATA is applied by the 
regress option vce(r). 
10
 Variables for per capita GDP, higher education and length of highways are dropped as 
coefficients of those variables are low, and the initial regression suffers from misspecification. 
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Table 5: Regression analysis results 
Dependent variable: τ̅ (EOS = 2) 
Regression 1: FE 2: FE 3: FE  4: FE 5: RE 6: RE 
 
Variable 
  1
st
 order 
differences 
   
gdp_pc -0.000*** 
(0.000) 
- - - - - 
urb_emp 0.0904 
(0.2150) 
-0.1254 
(0.4608) 
0.0481 
(0.0968) 
-0.3996 
(0.3455) 
-0.0741 
(0.1643) 
-0.1155 
(0.1140) 
gio_soe -0.0622 
(0.0515) 
-0.1092** 
(0.0494) 
0.0124 
(0.0091) 
-0.0162 
(0.0439) 
-0.0685 
(0.0522) 
0.0305 
(0.0412) 
edu -0.0025*** 
(0.0005) 
- - 
 
- - - 
railway 0.0891 
(0.0910) 
-0.2207 
(0.1327) 
0.1675 
(0.1301) 
-0.2040* 
(0.1011) 
-0.4190*** 
(0.0615) 
-0.3846*** 
(0.0641) 
highway -0.0015 
(0.0023) 
- - - - - 
gdp_sec -0.2575 
(0.2391) 
-0.6088*** 
(0.1761) 
-0.6339*** 
(0.1517) 
-0.8641*** 
(0.2152) 
-0.5499*** 
(0.1096) 
-0.6416*** 
(0.1122) 
gdp_ter -0.1479 
(0.1605) 
0.1781 
(0.2961) 
-0.0338 
(0.0967) 
0.0907 
(0.1381) 
-0.1589 
(0.2532) 
-0.0281 
(0.1260) 
time_1987 
(social turmoil) 
- - - -0.0051 
(0.0149) 
- -0.0029 
(0.0136) 
time_1994 
(fiscal reform) 
- - - -0.0311** 
(0.0114) 
- 0.0334*** 
(0.0109) 
time_2002 
(WTO entry) 
- - - -0.0501*** 
(0.0167) 
- -0.0384*** 
(0.0143) 
time_2008 
(global crisis) 
- - - -0.0330 
(0.0154) 
- -0.0370 
(0.0186) 
region_remote - - - - 0.1762*** 
(0.0352) 
0.1582*** 
(0.0299) 
Year-dummy YES YES NO NO YES NO 
Constant 0.7475*** 
(0.1346) 
1.0181 *** 
(0.1722) 
0.0045*** 
(0.0010) 
1.0739 *** 
(0.1597) 
0.9248*** 
(0.0935) 
0.8521*** 
(0.0686) 
F-statistic 
(p-value) 
0.0000
†
 0.0000
†
 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000
†
 0.0000 
R
2
 within 0.7750 0.6490 0.1016 0.5212 0.6411 0.5063 
R
2
 between 0.5130 0.0518 0.0524 0.0977 0.7564 0.7766 
R
2
 overall 0.4872 0.2427 0.0991 0.1797 0.7055 0.6780 
ρ 0.8454 0.8420 0.0787 0.8088 0.2211 0.1514 
Observations 407 407 407 407 407 407 
Note: Robust standard error in parentheses. Coefficient significantly different from zero with 
10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) confidence level (two tailed).  
†: Due to the year-dummies added there are more parameters than clusters in the model and a 
regular F-test is therefore not possible to perform. The test conducted is instead a joint test if 
the other parameters are equal to zero (year-dummy variables excluded)
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What do the results tell us? Per capita GDP was expected to have a negative 
coefficient. Surprisingly, the estimated coefficient is significantly very close to zero, and 
dropped due to misspecification. Length of highways as well as high education levels 
seem to lower trade costs, as expected. Urbanization does not seem to have any 
unambiguous effect on trade barriers. Both positive and negative values of coefficients 
are present, and none are significantly different from zero. The effect of state 
ownership in firms is also ambiguous. There is however a significant result in the 
second regression of a negative effect, that is lower trade barriers correlate with higher 
state ownership. It might be the case that state owned firms have well established 
contacts within the provincial regulatory bodies and can therefore gain access to 
facilitated trade routes. Coefficients in the other regressions are on the other hand both 
positive and negative, and there is no obvious inference. Developed transport 
infrastructure by means of railway expansion seems to lower trade costs. The fourth 
fixed effects regression and both of the random effects regressions show highly 
significant negative coefficients. Intuitively a more advanced and far reaching transport 
system lowers transport costs, and thus total trade costs. The very high coefficients of 
size of the second industrial sector are interesting. This supports the hypothesis of a 
connection between growth in the second industrial sector and diminishing barriers to 
domestic trade. The rational explanation could very well be that, as a second industrial 
sector is developed and industries expand, a wider range of tradable products arise on 
the market. Firms will lobby for trade facilitating policies in order to broaden their 
customer base, thus reducing trade barriers. Naturally, the causality may also be the 
opposite. Reduced trade costs and increased trade provide opportunities of trade in 
intermediate goods and large scale production in an industrialized environment. An 
expansion of the tertiary sector which provides intangible services does not 
immediately require trade facilitating measures due to the inherent features in trade in 
services. The positive effects found in some of the regression analyses can be 
explained as a relative decrease in easy-to-trade first and second sector products, 
rather than an increase in the service sector. 
The economic reforms in the mid-80s preceding the political turmoil in the late 1980s 
do not seem to have affected the domestic barriers to trade to any substantial level. It 
might be the case that the opening up reform and the invitation to foreign companies to 
establish factories in the PRC did not at this early stage affect the domestic integration. 
Fiscal reforms and the issuing of a company law in 1994 do seem to have had a 
negative effect on trade barriers. Qian and Roland (1998) claim, in contrast to this 
result, that fiscal centralization may prove harmful for market development, due to 
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softening of budget constraints and decreased competition. However, this theory is 
based on free movement of factors of production, which is hardly the case in the PRC. 
The government controls the distribution of several inputs and the provision of credit 
through the ownership of banks. Competition may indeed have increased as provincial 
governments now have to establish profitable industries in order to be given the grace 
of the central government, and subsequently be provided with a beneficial share of 
capital through the redistribution of tax revenue. Competition among firms might have 
risen further by the issuing of the Company Law which ensured private companies their 
legitimacy. Prior to the existence of the Company Law, managers may not have been 
able to compete without fear of termination of their business by the government. This 
was now possible, and managers had less to fear. 
As discussed in previous sections of this essay, and by Li, Qiu and Sun (2003), 
domestic integration is probably connected to international openness. Considering this 
econometric assessment, this connection is very clear. After WTO entry in late 2001 
barriers to cross provincial trade decreased significantly. The stimulus package 
launched in 2008 may have decreased trade barriers even further, due to an increase 
in consumption and thus an increased demand for local, non-local and foreign products. 
There is no significant result that supports this however. There is support for the 
hypothesis that the WTO accession had a negative effect on domestic trade barriers in 
the PRC. 
There is a very high and significant regional bias against remote provinces. Remote 
provinces have significantly higher cross-provincial trade costs. Coefficients represent 
a tariff equivalent iceberg trade cost which corresponds to a 15.8 – 17.6 per cent higher 
cost in remote areas of the country for goods with a low value of elasticity of 
substitution (EOS=2). For higher values, for example EOS = 12, the regional bias 
corresponds to an increased trade cost of 5.3 – 5.8 per cent. This further supports that 
domestic integration is correlated with foreign trade and access to foreign trade routes. 
Costs of engaging in trade with those regions are presumably higher due to higher 
transport costs to remote locations. 
What information does this provide to policymakers? Three main factors of increased 
domestic integration can be identified expansion of transport infrastructure, 
industrialization and foreign openness. Thus, an initial message is that in order to 
further lower trade costs in the PRC there is a need for expansion of infrastructure and 
means of communication and transport.  Infrastructural development is naturally a 
prerequisite for facilitated trade. Secondly, further industrialization and production of 
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tradable goods are indeed associated with lower barriers to cross-provincial trade. In 
many regions of the country people still live in poverty and are engaged in low 
productive labor. The development gap between the prosperous coastal provinces and 
the poor under-industrialized inland regions is a possible explanation of the regional 
bias found in the regression analysis. Agrarian societies far from the coast have small 
or no possibilities of engaging in business with foreign partners. They lack products to 
sell and adequate means of transport if they have any. If governments are to reduce 
barriers to trade they must initially focus on increasing the productivity though 
promoted industrialization and the establishment of a satisfactory transport system. 
Such policies will support domestic integration through the increased supply of tradable 
goods and lower trade costs by facilitated transport. The regional bias can neither be 
explained by under-industrialization nor inadequate infrastructure as indicators of such 
were included in the analysis. It can however be explained by the lack of access to 
foreign investment and international trade. Most of the foreign investments in China are 
indeed located in the coastal and central areas (Sauvant, Zhao and Huo 2012). If 
domestic trade barriers are affected by international integration, if seems reasonable 
that this effect is less significant in areas which are not exposed to foreign partners. 
Policies which attract foreign capital to remote areas may therefore remedy the bias 
against those regions and reduce barriers to cross-provincial trade. 
6 Study in China 
To get a more thorough understanding of the form and structure of barriers to trade, a 
field study in China was conducted. This adds a new dimension to this research, and 
contributes the experiences of businessmen and other actors on the Chinese market. 
The indirect measurement of trade barriers and the econometric analysis in this paper 
reveals the overall development in domestic trade barriers, but in order to fully 
understand the effects of the actual situation in China, a qualitative study was desirable. 
Qualitative interviews with Chinese entrepreneurs or representatives of firms as well as 
foreign firms located in China operating towards the Chinese domestic market are 
essential to this research. The interviews do not, and were not intended to generate 
datasets applicable to further econometric assessment, but are instead focused on the 
everyday issues related to domestic trade. It is possible that domestic trade barriers in 
the PRC are partly built on non-tariff protectionist policies from local government, and 
the nature of these barriers might vary greatly depending on sector and province. 
Furthermore, it can also be the case that barriers to trade are unconsciously generated 
by several economic actors. Barriers to trade should not be interpreted as the sole 
active aspiration of hindering trade by tariffs and policies. It is likely that there exists 
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trade protection without any distinct motive from any party. The estimated trade 
barriers include all barriers to trade, including transportation costs and other natural 
barriers to trade. 
Hence, the field study had two objectives. First, understanding the nature of barriers to 
domestic trade in the PRC is essential. Do firms experience any barriers to trade, what 
are the actual trade barriers, and are the barriers shared among all firms? Second, do 
firms in the PRC experience that those barriers have changed over time, and are there 
any distinct events in history that had a distinguishable impact on domestic trade, 
positive or negative? Does the experience of Chinese managers conform to the 
econometric results found prior to the field trip? Those questions were to be answered 
by this field study. Interviews were conducted as open and non-linear as possible, 
where the manager or representative of the firm is given the opportunity to steer the 
discussion within relevant topics, stressing the issues which are most relevant for the 
firm in question. Typically, the initial question was: “does the company you represent 
do business in many parts in China?” and “Do you find that firms on the Chinese 
market, regardless of origin, compete on even terms?” 
The initial stages of the field study were directed through an invitation by the Nordic 
Centre at Fudan University in Shanghai, which is a joint project between Fudan 
University and several universities in the Nordic countries undertaking research 
projects and educational activities. The invitation regarded a weeklong course in 
international economics, with a focus on China, in the beginning of April 2013. This 
course consisted of lectures on the Chinese economy by teachers at Fudan University, 
but also seminars on the business environment in China incorporating managers and 
representatives from business enterprises and firms. This created a unique opportunity 
to get a comprehensive insight into the Chinese day-to-day business management, and 
provided a knowledgebase for the continuation of the field work. 
6.1 Experiences of Chinese Firms 
Several representatives of firms were contacted for the purpose of this study. 
Contributors are listed in Table 6. Interestingly, none of the contributors could pinpoint 
any specific barrier to cross-provincial trade in the PRC. 
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Table 6: Contributors 
Contact Company Profession Consumer 
Base 
Tong Qi CMS Senior Associate Shanghai, 
Beijing 
Jia Ying CSR & Company 
China 
Founding Partner Entire China 
Cai Kaifang TOPWAY 
International 
Education 
Founder Entire China 
Lars Fabricus Alfa Laval Production 
Facility 
Factory Manager Entire China 
Eric L. Brubaker SKF Global Technical 
Centre Asia 
Manager Entire China 
Alex Peng JAC Motors Passenger Car 
Asia Sales 
Manager 
Entire China 
N/A Nissan Motor 
Company 
Exhibitor Entire China 
N/A Mazda Motor 
Corporation 
Exhibitor Entire China 
 
CMS is a provider of legal and tax advice to both Chinese and foreign clients. With 
expertise in the Chinese legal and regulatory framework, the senior associate Tong Qi 
provided insights regarding judicial and regulatory issues. Most important are the 
functions of the Huji system (户籍制度), more commonly known as the Hukou (户口). 
This is a household registration required by the law and originates from ancient China. 
Every citizen in China is officially identified as a resident of the area where they were 
born, and certain privileges and social security are usually only available within that 
designated area. This regulatory system does indeed give rise to migration barriers 
within China. The regulations only affect social issues such as daycare and schooling 
for children, and do not affect the possibility of starting businesses outside the Hukou. 
Tong Qi stresses that the Hukou system does not pose any formal obstacle to starting 
a business in regions from where the person does not originate. It is therefore possible 
for companies to establish subsidiary companies in other parts of China and engage in 
frictionless trade in intermediate goods or complementary products. 
34 
 
At the Nordic Centre at Fudan University I came into contact with several Chinese 
entrepreneurs, among them Jia Ying, founding partner of CSR & Company China 
focusing on corporate social responsibility issues in China. He is also co-founder of 
several other Chinese NGOs. He has never experienced any issues, or worked with 
any companies which experienced issues, concerning cross provincial trade. To his 
knowledge, the barriers to trade found in previous studies are possibly incorrect, and 
he pointed out that in any supermarket in China you find domestic products originating 
from all parts of the country. He has been in business since 2004 and is unaware of 
any prior trade barriers. He suggests that if there still are any significant barriers to 
trade they would be present in sectors protected by the government, local or central. 
Another entrepreneur and founder of TOPWAY International Education, Cai Kaifang 
also supports this view. 
The experience of Lars Fabricus, factory manager at Alfa Laval Production Facility in 
Kunshan outside Shanghai is similar to the Chinese entrepreneurs. Alfa Laval is a 
leading producer of separators of solutions, fluid transfers and heat transfers and has 
customers all over the world, and all across China. 75 per cent of the manufacturing in 
Kunshan is produced for the Chinese market and 25 per cent for international direct 
sales. Those distributors are located in various provinces and Alfa Laval does not 
experience any obstacles related to cross provincial trade. Competition has been 
increasingly fierce, mostly due to the rise of several Chinese companies producing 
substitutable products. 
This is also true for Eric L. Brubaker, manager of the Global Technical Centre Asia for 
SKF, a company producing ball bearings, seals and lubrication systems. Those two 
foreign firms employ local distributors to supply Chinese customers. They sell products 
to all of China through distributors and do not experience any barriers to trade between 
provinces. 
Protected sectors would be any of the strategic industries presented in the five year 
plans presented at the plenary sessions of the Central Committee. The guidelines of 
the twelfth and current plan include several strategic sectors, among them the 
automobile industry. Michael Dunne (2013), an expert on China’s automobile industry, 
also points out that the automobile sector is indeed a heavily protected sector, at least 
externally. If international trade protection is high, the incentive is high for local 
governments to protect local industries as the survival of local firms is essential for 
maintaining high tax revenue. Increased external openness can therefore affect cross-
provincial trade barriers. 
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During the 15th Shanghai International Automobile Industry Exhibition over 2000 
Chinese and foreign exhibitors were present. This event presented the opportunity to 
get in touch with the supposedly highly protected automobile industrial sector. 
Regardless of the high protection, several automobile producers, both Chinese and 
foreign, have the same opinion as the previously interviewed company representatives. 
Alex Peng is the Passenger Car Asia Sales Manager for JAC Motors, a Chinese 
automobile company located in Anhui province. JAC Motors is a state owned 
enterprise founded in 1964 and producing over 500 000 vehicles annually, both for the 
Chinese market and for exporting to over 100 countries worldwide. According to Peng 
there is no protectionism within the automobile sector. He does point out that domestic 
producers have an advantage over foreign as they have more experience of consumer 
demand in China. However, this advantage is rapidly diminishing as foreign actors 
adjust to the Chinese market. Furthermore, he points out that the competition on the 
automobile market is very fierce, and there are many producers. The cross provincial 
trade does not pose any obstacle to competition according to him. With respect to the 
ownership structure of JAC Motors, Peng admits that the local government of Anhui 
province may support the company through various channels, but he cannot see any 
direct protectionist behavior or trade related interventions by the government. 
Considering the high presence of foreign automobile producers in China and their 
access to various markets in the country, there do not seem to be any biases. Naturally, 
higher activities of foreign firms are found in the coastal provinces and in economically 
more developed areas. Both Japanese companies, Nissan Motor Company and Mazda 
Motor Corporation, have over four hundred resellers in China. Representatives of these 
companies find that the Chinese market is unified and are not able to pinpoint any 
direct regulatory or administrative differences between provinces regarding trade 
procedures in doing business. The overall market access has most probably improved 
since the WTO accession. 
6.2 Summary and Comments of the Field Study 
Experiences of the Chinese and foreign entrepreneurs and company representatives 
are homogenously negative towards the perception of any barriers to cross-provincial 
trade.  None of the representatives interviewed during the field study had experienced 
any barriers to trade. This is truly an interesting outcome. According to the indirect 
measurement of trade barriers presented in this paper, and the econometric 
assessment, such barriers are indeed present. Estimated trade barriers vary between 
provinces and over time. Those barriers have certainly decreased substantially during 
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the past decade, but they are still present. Trade barriers for 2011 were estimated to be 
10-40 per cent on average depending on EOS (see Figure 4). 
There is undeniably a discrepancy. How can it be the case that all those interviewed 
during the field study agree that there are no barriers to cross-provincial trade in the 
PRC? Two main reasons for this inconsistency can be highlighted. First, it might be 
that the econometric results of this and other studies are incorrect due to inferior data 
or modeling problems. Second, there might very well exist barriers to cross-provincial 
trade in the PRC, but the barriers are not of an administrative or political nature and are 
therefore not apparent for the entrepreneurs and companies operating on the Chinese 
market. Nevertheless, there still are barriers present and other things being equal 
provinces are consuming more locally produced goods rather than importing. 
If we assume the results from the trade barrier estimation to be true and that trade 
barriers do exist, why would those barriers to trade not be experienced by the 
businessmen and businesswoman operating on the market? There are several reasons 
why obstacles to trade may not be perceived as direct barriers to trade by the 
entrepreneurs. First, consumers may tend to purchase locally produced goods and 
services. Imported products may indeed be substitutable for the locally produced goods, 
but tend to differ slightly. Consumers choosing between similar goods tend to purchase 
locally produced goods as they have purchased those goods before. This is a safe 
choice and the consumer is sure to be satisfied. Another study by Xu and Li (2011) do 
indeed find such an effect. In international economics, this is called a home bias. 
Second, firms tend to sell products locally as they know the demands and consumer 
preferences on the local market better than foreign markets. Other advantages of the 
local market may be easy access to finance and insurances due to personal contact 
networks and knowledge of local rules and regulations. Even in the case of similar 
regulations between provinces, the effort in order to gain access to this information 
may still be higher. Theoretically this can be compared to the heterogeneous firm 
model in international economics (Melitz, 2003) and the importance of fixed costs 
related to trade. Third, NTB may of course be regarded as natural costs related to trade. 
This can be costs related to transport. This cost can be reduced by development of 
infrastructure and transport routes. This is supported by the results of the econometric 
analysis. The construction of railways is negatively correlated to trade costs. This study 
does not control for all infrastructural development but trade costs are nonetheless 
related to the possibility of eased trade, and transport costs of goods are reasonably 
always present in some form. 
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7 Conclusions 
This paper has aimed to answer two main questions. First, the question was posed 
whether there are domestic barriers to trade between provinces in the PRC, and if so, 
how they have varied over time. To capture these NTBs to domestic trade, I used an 
indirect methodology based on the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) gravity model 
and Novy (2013) ratio of trade barriers. Second, the thesis also sought to identify 
factors that can explain variation in these domestic trade barriers, or, put differently, to 
find the sources of the internal barriers. This question was approached from two rather 
different methodological perspectives. First, the indirectly derived measures of 
domestic trade barriers were used as the dependent variable in a regression analysis, 
where a rich set of explanatory variables was included to see whether they can explain 
any of the statistical variation. Second, in-depth interviews were also performed in the 
field with Chinese firms and foreign firms operating on the Chinese market in order to 
determine what they perceive to be the causes of such trade barriers. 
 The first part of the analysis, where indirectly derived measures of domestic trade 
barriers were calculated, led to three main conclusions. First, there are indeed internal 
barriers to cross-provincial trade in the PRC. The exact magnitude of these depends on 
several underlying assumptions, but given reasonable assumptions, the average 
domestic trade barriers correspond to an iceberg trade cost of 0.12 – 0.53 in 1981 and 
0.09 – 0.39 in 2011 depending on the value of elasticity of substitution. Second, the 
estimated tariff equivalent barriers to cross-provincial trade vary over time. Importantly, 
they are on average significantly lower during the last decade. Estimated trade barriers 
decreased by approximately 25 per cent from 1981 to 2011. Third, there is a huge 
variation between provinces. In fact, comparing the provinces with the lowest and the 
highest domestic barriers, there was a 22 per cent difference in 1981 and 41 per cent 
difference in 2011.  Some provinces lowered trade costs considerably over this period 
of time, while others were unchanged. 
Having established that there are indeed domestic trade barriers and that they vary 
both over time and across provinces, the essay then sought to explain these 
differences.  The first part of this analysis, where the estimated trade barriers were 
analyzed in a panel data regression, led to four notable results. First, there is a 
significant connection between decreasing domestic trade barriers and WTO entry. 
This suggests that cross provincial protectionism is high as a result of external 
protectionism and domestic fiscal decentralization. Predictions of diminishing trade 
barriers as a result of international openness and WTO accession also fit the 
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econometric results of this paper. Second, development in transport infrastructure 
(specifically railways) significantly decreases trade costs. This is not surprising, 
because the establishment of a functioning and frictionless transport network is 
generally seen as essential for facilitating trade.  
Third, growth in the second industrial sector is also correlated with low trade costs. The 
thesis argues that there exists a two-way causality between industrialization and 
lowered trade costs. On the one hand, increased industrialization provides a broader 
range of tradable customer products. Producers need to expand their customer base 
and have incentives to lobby for reduced trade costs. However, similar effects are not 
obvious with respect to the third industrial sector due to the inherent nature of services. 
On the other hand, it could of course also be possible that the causality is the opposite. 
Lower trade costs can facilitate the development the industrial sector. Fourth, there is a 
regional bias against remote areas regarding cross-provincial trade barriers. Provinces 
located in the western and northern parts of China have significantly higher cross-
provincial trade costs, presumably because of longer transports. The average trade 
costs in remote provinces correspond to an iceberg trade cost 0.15 – 0.17 higher than 
in other areas of the country assuming EOS = 2, and approximately 0.05 assuming 
EOS = 12. 
The question of what causes the (variation in) domestic trade barriers was also 
approached by conducting field interviews with company representatives and 
entrepreneurs in Shanghai, China. Interestingly, the field study conducted in China and 
the econometric testing of the estimated trade barriers show contradicting results. 
Chinese and foreign entrepreneurs and company representatives contributing to this 
study were consistently negative regarding the perception of any barriers to cross-
provincial trade. In other words, their assessment was that it was as easy to sell 
products within a given province as it was to ship the goods to another province and 
sell them there. This, of course, stands in contrast to both the results from the initial 
analysis, which established that there are indeed barriers, and the subsequent 
econometric analysis where several causes of the barriers were found. While 
pinpointing the exact reason for this anomaly is beyond the scope of this paper, several 
possible explanations were discussed; home bias effect, heterogeneous firms and fixed 
costs in production, and natural trade costs such as transport of goods. One should 
keep in mind two facts in relation to this. First, there is a difference between perceived 
barriers to trade and actual barriers to trade. Company managers may primarily only 
take into consideration tariffs and policies aiming at trade related issues. This does not 
have to be the case. Second, the approximated trade barriers include all costs related 
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to trade, including transport costs.  Transport costs are likely to be substantial 
considering the many mountainous and hard to access rural regions of the spatially 
vast country. Furthermore, there was a possibility of using inaccurate data in this study, 
which subsequently gave rise to this anomaly. 
What can policymakers in China learn from this study? Well, I would certainly like to 
stress that there are issues with the data used and that the results are also to some 
extent dependent on the underlying assumptions that are made. One should therefore 
not take the results too literally. Keep in mind the high variation between provinces, 
implying that the estimated trade barriers may not be representative for any single 
province, but is to be regarded as an indicator for overall domestic market integration. 
In general, the inconsistency between outcomes of the econometric analysis and the 
field study imply that one must realize that NTBs are problematic to countervail, not 
only because of the inherent difficulties of quantification, but also because they may not 
be perceived as barriers to trade. Nevertheless, the essay does point in the direction of 
several lessons worth learning. Policymakers in China ought to consider transport 
costs in order to promote cross-provincial trade. Remote areas of the country have 
generally higher trade barriers and an adequate quality of infrastructure is essential for 
development. The economic development in China is unevenly progressive in various 
regions, and incorporation of remote areas through for example infrastructure is 
essential for further development in those areas. Increased domestic trade facilitates 
the industrialization process of rural areas, and the importance of domestic economic 
integration must be highlighted. Furthermore, as international cooperation and 
exposure to foreign competition are correlated to diminishing cross-provincial trade 
barriers, a continued open foreign policy is appreciated.  
Compared to the previous literature, this paper uses a methodology based on the 
gravity equation to indirectly estimate barriers to trade applied on a long-run dataset 
ranging from 1981 to 2011. The outcomes of this analysis contribute to the ongoing 
debate in the sense that they provide an overview of the long-run development of trade 
barriers in China. Previous studies applying data for short periods of time, for example 
the period 1992-2002 studied by Wong (2012) and 1987-1997 studied by Poncet (2001) 
are obviously not representative for a long-run development of market integration. This 
further explains the lack of consensus on the question of whether trade barriers in the 
PRC are increasing or decreasing, as several outcomes are possible depending on the 
applied time period. During some periods, trade barriers were rising and previous 
analysts (Wong 2012, Young 2000, Poncet 2001, 2003 and 2005) therefore found a 
harmful development in China. I am hopeful that this study can offer a significant 
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contribution to the growing literature on domestic economic integration in China. Still, 
there are of course many issues where further research could prove to be very fruitful.  
For instance, the definite causality between decreasing barriers to trade and the 
development of a second industrial sector is still undetermined. Precise mechanisms in 
this relation have to be identified if more detailed policies are to be discussed. 
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9 Appendices 
9.1 Definitions of Data 
 
Variable 
 
Definition and unit 
 
Source 
Domestic Exports The value of commodities 
sold by the establishments to 
other establishments and 
individuals of different status 
of registration. 100 million 
Yuan. 
Statistical Yearbooks retrieved 
from China Data Online 
Database. 
Net Exports The exports of goods and 
services minus the imports of 
goods and services. 100 
million Yuan. 
Statistical Yearbooks retrieved 
from China Data Online 
Database. 
Exchange Rate National currency units per 
US dollar. 100 million Yuan. 
Penn World Tables 7.1. 
Total Imports The purchase of 
commodities by wholesale 
and retail establishments. 
100 million Yuan. 
Statistical Yearbooks retrieved 
from China Data Online 
Database. 
Total Consumption The total expenditure of 
resident units on final 
consumption of goods and 
services. 100 million Yuan. 
Statistical Yearbooks retrieved 
from China Data Online 
Database. 
International Exports The value of commodities 
exported beyond the 
boundary of China. 1000 
USD. 
Statistical Yearbooks retrieved 
from China Data Online 
Database. 
Total Output The final products of all 
resident units in a country (or 
a region). 100 million Yuan. 
Statistical Yearbooks retrieved 
from China Data Online 
Database. 
Per capita GDP 
(gdp_pc) 
The final products of all 
resident units in a country (or 
a region) divided by the 
number of inhabitants. Yuan 
per person. 
Statistical Yearbooks retrieved 
from China Data Online 
Database. 
Urban employment 
(urb_emp) 
Per cent labor force in urban 
areas. Permanent residents 
of working age in the urban 
areas engaged in non-
agricultural activities. 
Statistical Yearbooks retrieved 
from China Data Online 
Database. 
gio_soe Per cent of the final products 
of all resident units in a 
country (or a region) 
contributed by companies 
registered as state owned 
enterprises. 
Statistical Yearbooks retrieved 
from China Data Online 
Database. 
Number of persons 
enrolled in higher 
education 
(edu) 
Number of persons enrolled 
in higher education. They 
include full-time universities, 
colleges, high professional 
schools and short-term 
professional universities. 
10 000 persons. 
Statistical Yearbooks retrieved 
from China Data Online 
Database. 
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Length of railways 
(railway) 
The total length of the trunk 
line for passenger and freight 
transportation (including both 
full operation and temporary 
operation). 10 000 km. 
Statistical Yearbooks retrieved 
from China Data Online 
Database. 
Second industrial sector 
(gdp_sec) 
Per cent share of contribution 
to GDP from secondary 
industry (including mining 
and quarrying, 
manufacturing, production 
and supply of electricity, 
water and gas) and 
construction 
Statistical Yearbooks retrieved 
from China Data Online 
Database. 
Third industrial sector 
(gdp_ter) 
Per cent share of contribution 
to GDP from tertiary industry 
(all other industries not 
included in primary or 
secondary industry). Primary 
industry includes agriculture 
(including farming, forestry, 
animal husbandry and 
fishery). 
Statistical Yearbooks retrieved 
from China Data Online 
Database. 
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9.2 Additional Regression Results 
 
Dependent variable: τ̅ (EOS = 5) 
Regression 1: FE 2: FE 3: FE  4: FE 5: RE 6: RE 
 
Variable 
  1
st
 order 
differences 
   
gdp_pc -0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
- - - - - 
urb_emp 0.0126 
(0.1224) 
-0.0811 
(0.2443) 
0.0354 
(0.0650) 
-0.2424 
(0.1797) 
-0.0335 
(0.0949) 
-0.0708 
(0.0702) 
gio_soe -0.0241 
(0.0281) 
-0.0476* 
(0.0254) 
0.0106 
(0.0062) 
0.0009 
(0.0232) 
-0.0281 
(0.0270) 
0.0229 
(0.0216) 
edu -0.0013*** 
(0.0003) 
- - - - - 
railway 0.0456 
(0.0597) 
-0.1106 
(0.0776) 
0.0751 
(0.0717) 
-0.1016* 
(0.0558) 
-0.2554*** 
(0.0397) 
-0.2392*** 
(0.0391) 
highway 0.0000 
(0.0010) 
- - - - - 
gdp_sec -0.1861 
(0.1466) 
-0.3625*** 
(0.1074) 
-0.3744*** 
(0.0726) 
-0.4974*** 
(0.1209) 
-0.3343*** 
(0.0663) 
-0.3859*** 
(0.0665) 
gdp_ter -0.1516 
(0.0941) 
-0.1527 
(0.1566) 
0.0005 
(0.0550) 
-0.0822 
(0.0742) 
-0.1318 
(0.1367) 
-0.0332 
(0.0691) 
time_1987 
(social turmoil) 
- - - -0.0011 
(0.0089) 
- -0.0008 
(0.0087) 
time_1994 
(fiscal reform) 
- - - 0.0225*** 
(0.0069) 
- 0.0233*** 
(0.0070) 
time_2002 
(WTO entry) 
- - - -0.0281*** 
(0.0084) 
- -0.0202*** 
(0.0073) 
time_2008 
(global crisis) 
- - - -0.0159* 
(0.0082) 
- -0.0173 
(0.0092) 
region_remote - - - - 0.1145*** 
(0.0224) 
0.1047*** 
(0.0196) 
Year-dummy YES YES NO NO YES NO 
Constant 0.4213*** 
(0.0798) 
0.5528*** 
(0.0967) 
-0.0023*** 
(0.0006) 
0.5807*** 
(0.0859) 
0.4997*** 
(0.0547) 
0.4600*** 
(0.0418) 
F-statistic 
(p-value) 
0.0000
†
 0.0000
†
 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000
†
 0.0000 
R
2
 within 0.7846 0.6865 0.1031 0.5503 0.6757 0.5334 
R
2
 between 0.2715 0.0282 0.1092 0.0713 0.7975 0.8140 
R
2
 overall 0.3643 0.1994 0.1092 0.1439 0.7440 0.7196 
ρ 0.9022 0.8893 0.0884 0.8561 0.2633 0.1916 
Observations 407 407 407 407 407 407 
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Dependent variable: τ̅ (EOS = 8) 
Regression 1: FE 2: FE 3: FE  4: FE 5: RE 6: RE 
 
Variable 
  1
st
 order 
differences 
   
gdp_pc -0.000*** 
(0.000) 
- - - - - 
urb_emp -0.001 
(0.0852) 
-0.0592 
(0.1652) 
0.0251 
(0.0464) 
-0.1700 
(0.1208) 
-0.0225 
(0.0656) 
-0.0510 
(0.0495) 
gio_soe -0.0143 
(0.0192) 
-0.0297 
(0.0172) 
0.0080* 
(0.0044) 
0.0026 
(0.0156) 
-0.0172 
(0.0180) 
0.0167 
(0.0144) 
edu -0.0008*** 
(0.0002) 
- - - - - 
railway 0.0306 
(0.0424) 
-0.0726 
(0.0536) 
0.0477 
(0.0489) 
-0.0666* 
(0.0380) 
-0.1768*** 
(0.0284) 
-0.1663*** 
(0.0274) 
highway 0.0001 
(0.0007) 
- - - - - 
gdp_sec -0.1344 
(0.0970) 
-0.2506*** 
(0.0748) 
-0.2591*** 
(0.0487) 
-0.3412*** 
(0.0824) 
-0.2328*** 
(0.0466) 
-0.2684*** 
(0.0463) 
gdp_ter -0.1159* 
(0.0655) 
-0.1136 
(0.1053) 
-0.0030 
(0.0381) 
-0.0618 
(0.0503) 
-0.0978 
(-0.0926) 
-0.0262 
(0.0472) 
time_1987 
(social turmoil) 
- - - -0.0004 
(0.0062) 
- -0.0003 
(0.0062) 
time_1994 
(fiscal reform) 
- - - 0.0163*** 
(0.0048) 
- 0.0168*** 
(0.0050) 
time_2002 
(WTO entry) 
- - - -0.0192*** 
(0.0056) 
- -0.0136*** 
(0.0049) 
time_2008 
(global crisis) 
- - - -0.0104* 
(0.0056) 
- -0.0112* 
(0.0061) 
region_remote - - - - 0.0813*** 
(0.0160) 
0.0747*** 
(0.0140) 
Year-dummy YES YES NO NO YES NO 
Constant 0.2890*** 
(0.0553) 
0.3747*** 
(0.0662) 
-0.0015*** 
(0.0004) 
0.3930*** 
(0.0581) 
0.3383*** 
(0.0381) 
0.3117*** 
(0.0294) 
F-statistic 
(p-value) 
0.0000
†
 0.0000
†
 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000
†
 0.0000 
R
2
 within 0.7848 0.6943 0.1031 0.5561 0.6826 0.5386 
R
2
 between 0.1875 0.0214 0.1241 0.0632 0.8045 0.8203 
R
2
 overall 0.3255 0.1860 0.1017 0.1332 0.7507 0.7270 
ρ 0.9124 0.8990 0.0928 0.8664 0.2779 0.2061 
Observations 407 407 407 407 407 407 
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Dependent variable: τ̅ (EOS = 12) 
Regression 1: FE 2: FE 3: FE  4: FE 5: RE 6: RE 
 
Variable 
  1
st
 order 
differences 
   
gdp_pc -0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
- - - - - 
urb_emp -0.0045 
(0.0605) 
-0.0433 
(0.1152) 
0.0197 
(0.0333) 
-0.1210 
(0.0840) 
-0.0158 
(0.0464) 
-0.0370 
(0.0354) 
gio_soe -0.0092 
(0.0134) 
-0.0197 
(0.0118) 
0.0059* 
(0.0032) 
0.0026 
(0.0108) 
-0.0112 
(0.0125) 
0.0121 
(0.0100) 
edu -0.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
- - - - - 
railway 0.0213 
(0.0304) 
-0.0497 
(0.0378) 
0.0321 
(0.0343) 
-0.0455 
(0.0266) 
-0.1247*** 
(0.0205) 
-0.1175*** 
(0.0195) 
highway 0.0002 
(0.0005) 
- - - - - 
gdp_sec -0.0970 
(0.0683) 
-0.1768*** 
(0.0530) 
-0.1829*** 
(0.0329) 
-0.2397*** 
(0.0578) 
-0.1649** 
(0.0332) 
-0.1900*** 
(0.0328) 
gdp_ter -0.0861* 
(0.0465) 
-0.0833 
(0.0731) 
-0.0035 
(0.0270) 
-0.0456 
(0.0351) 
-0.0717 
(0.0647) 
-0.0198 
(0.0332) 
time_1987 
(social turmoil) 
- - - -0.0001 
(0.0044) 
- -0.0002 
(0.0044) 
time_1994 
(fiscal reform) 
- - - 0.0118*** 
(0.0034) 
- 0.0121*** 
(0.0035) 
time_2002 
(WTO entry) 
- - - -0.0135*** 
(0.0038) 
- -0.0095*** 
(0.0034) 
time_2008 
(global crisis) 
- - - -0.0071* 
(0.0039) 
- -0.0076* 
(0.0042) 
region_remote - - - - 0.0582*** 
(0.0115) 
0.0536*** 
(0.0101) 
Year-dummy YES YES NO NO YES NO 
Constant 0.2031*** 
(0.0391) 
0.2615*** 
(0.0465) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0003) 
0.2741*** 
(0.0405) 
0.2360*** 
(0.0270) 
0.2176*** 
(0.0210) 
F-statistic 
(p-value) 
0.0000
†
 0.0000
†
 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000
†
 0.0000 
R
2
 within 0.7845 0.6983 0.1031 0.5589 0.6862 0.5412 
R
2
 between 0.1422 0.0177 0.1321 0.0585 0.8078 0.8233 
R
2
 overall 0.3029 0.1781 0.1003 0.1270 0.7538 0.7305 
ρ 0.9175 0.9040 0.0956 0.8719 0.2869 0.2150 
Observations 407 407 407 407 407 407 
Note: Robust standard error in parentheses. Coefficient significantly different from zero with 
10% (*). 5% (**) and 1% (***) confidence level (two tailed).  
†: Due to the year-dummies added there are more parameters than clusters in the model and a 
regular F-test is therefore not possible to perform. The test conducted is instead a joint test if 
the other parameters are equal to zero (year-dummy variables excluded)
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9.3 Variable Correlations  
 
Correlation matrix    
Variable Unit Correlation    
tar_est gdp_pc urb_emp gio_soe edu railway highway gdp_sec gdp_ter 
τ̅ (EOS=2) Per cent 1.0000 - - - - - - - - 
gdp_pc Yuan per 
person 
-0.4141 1.0000 - - - - - - - 
urb_emp Per cent 0.1628 0.1375 1.0000 - - - - - - 
gio_soe Per cent 0.4786 -0.7752 0.0127 1.0000 - - - - - 
edu 10 000 
persons 
-0.7280 0.6437 -0.2242 -0.6219 1.0000 - - - - 
railway 10 000 km -0.5305 0.2809 0.1605 -0.2481 0.3102 1.0000 - - - 
highway 10 000 km -0.6473 0.6139 -0.2901 -0.5771 0.7829 0.4199 1.0000   
gdp_sec Per cent -0.4089 0.3609 0.1277 -0.2429 0.3858 0.2511 0.3205 1.0000 - 
gdp_ter Per cent 0.0245 0.5580 0.2349 -0.5487 0.3016 0.0143 0.2604 0.0150 1.0000 
